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Abstract
Usable security research to date has focused on making
users more secure, by identifying and addressing usability
issues that lead users to making mistakes, or by persuading
users to pay attention to security and make secure choices.
However, security goals were set by security experts, who
were unaware that users often have other priorities and
value security differently. In this paper, we present exam-
ples of circumventions and non-adoption of secure systems
designed under this paternalistic mindset. We argue that
security experts need to identify user values and deliver
on them. To do that, we need a methodological framework
that can conceptualise values and identify those that impact
user engagement with security. We show that (a) engage-
ment with, and adherence to security, are mediated by user
values, and that (b) it is necessary to model those values
to understand the nature of security’s failures and to design
viable alternatives.
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Introduction
The usable security research community, in its investiga-
tions of how users interact with security mechanisms, has
often found security to hinder or compete with user goals,
sometimes because of unusable user interfaces [7, 12, 16].
This has led some to believe in the existence of a trade-off
between usability and security. In some cases, however,
users choose to disengage from security altogether. Con-
cepts like productivity [3, 24], cost [14] or utility [22] have
come up in the field’s literature, which could explain why.
The usable security community has so far focused on en-
hancing the usability of already existing security systems,
with a narrow interpretation of usability: they focus exclu-
sively on ‘fixing’ human users (rather than fixing technolo-
gies), so as to render them ‘able’ to ‘use’ security. Conse-
quently, non-usability-related causes of user disengage-
ment from security are not examined. Security experts fail
to notice the divergence between what they imagine user
values to be and users’ actual values. This divergence, in
turn, can cause otherwise usable security artefacts to be
useless, counter-productive or even harmful.
Examples abound, e.g. in the literature on security warn-
ings. Usable security researchers aim to ‘fix’ user compli-
ance to warnings, e.g. by making them waste time re-typing
some of the warning’s content [6] or by showing differ-
ent warnings every time to prevent them from recognising
warnings [2]. They propose such approaches even though
warnings sometimes provide no security benefit at all [14].
Sasse [21] argued that instead, the community should ac-
knowledge that users have other priorities, and focus on
how often warnings must be shown.
Similar issues exist with password research. Bonneau et al.
argue in favour of training users to remember 15-character
random passwords [5]. Yet, the fact it can be achieved in a
lab doesn’t mean it is something users would want to do:
entry times and error rates increase dramatically with 8+-
character passwords [23], and longer passwords are more
likely to fail after periods of non-usage (e.g. vacations).
In the real world, users’ main concerns are ‘Will I be able
to remember it?’, and ‘Will I be able to enter it correctly?’.
‘How secure is it?’ comes a very distant third.
We argue that Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) can help our
research community understand what users value, and re-
alise it has been working against users’ interests by adopt-
ing a narrow stance on the goals of usable security. Too
little focus has been put on what users’ priorities are – and
how to get there securely. In this paper, we reflect on past
research experiences which taught us that (a) engagement
with security is mediated by user values and (b) those val-
ues must be modelled if we want to understand the nature
of security failures and to design viable alternatives. We
discuss how relevant user values are to user adoption and
usage of security technologies, and discuss the potential
benefits of embracing VSD for our community.
Case Studies in Personal Computing
Why Secure Communication Tools Don’t Get Adopted
Usability has long been considered a key challenge for
secure communications, in particular encryption. Several
users studies (e.g. [9, 13, 26]) have examined why users
fail to use existing secure communication tools such as
PGP correctly, often concluding that significant security fail-
ures arise due to user interface design flaws. Abu-Salma
et al. [1] interviewed 60 users about their experience with
different communication tools and their perceptions of the
tools’ security and privacy. Despite visible usability issues in
some tools’ interfaces, participants did not report usability
to be a primary obstacle to their adopting of secure tools.
Instead, they were concerned about the fragmentation of
user bases across incompatible tools. Most communica-
tions are spontaneous rather than planned; to reach their
communication partners, users either need to use the same
communication tool, or tools need to be interoperable. As
users valued the convenience of using the most directly
available communication tool more than they valued se-
curity, they did not adopt secure communication tools. By
developing completely new tools, the security community
has failed to satisfy users’ primary expectation: reaching
their peers as conveniently as possible.
A Value-Sensitive Analysis of Application Appropriation
Dodier-Lazaro et al. [11] interviewed 13 Linux users about
how they adopt and abandon apps, and how they adapt
them with plugins. Using a value-sensitive analysis, they
found that app adoption was primarily driven by utility (the
presence of specific features or content); app abandonment
by utility and reliability (the app was not slow, unstable or
too heavy); and the adoption of app plugins by productivity
(helping users perform tasks or access resources quicker)
and utility. Security played a minor role in participants’ app
appropriation decisions, behind all the aforementioned val-
ues. This work was motivated by the fact that app develop-
ers on platforms where sandboxing is available often refuse
to support it. They fear losing users because of the restric-
tions sandboxing imposes on features and app plugins. The
study confirmed the legitimacy of those fears, and calls into
question why sandboxes are so disruptive to utility, the main
driver of app adoption and retainment.
Case Study in Organisational Security
Bartsch and Sasse [3] analysed interviews with 118 em-
ployees of a trans-national company on their compliance
to access control measures in diverse contexts. Issues
were found in the procedures for policy changing and in the
decision-making process of policies, which affected employ-
ees’ productivity and caused them to circumvent security
in order to remain productive. In that organisation, a value
conflict between security and productivity existed. Still, em-
ployees reported discomfort in breaching security policies,
and some even went on to deploy their own security mea-
sures, showing they valued security.
Bartsch et al. point out the role of social values: some em-
ployees would grant access to systems so that requesting
employees would escape the emotional cost of being de-
nied access; or, they would grant another team access to
a system as a bargaining chip for future relations. The em-
ployees who deployed their own security measures relented
the absence of high-level security guidelines from the or-
ganisation: they valued its expertise on security, despite
rejecting how security was implemented. While those value
conflicts were less commonly witnessed than the security-
productivity conflict, their existence warrants a deeper in-
vestigation of how social values can supersede security.
Organisations’ information systems are used and main-
tained by humans with diverse interests and hierarchical
structures. The values embedded in those interests and
structures mediate how they cooperatively maintain infor-
mation systems, including security components. Hence, the
values of an organisation must be taken into account when
designing and deploying security measures for its systems.
A General Problem in Usable Security
We have provided examples that demonstrated that that
what users value – utility, productivity, ease of use, etc. –
causes them to disengage from secure systems that reduce
utility and usability. But are these studies an exception to
how security fits within users’ experiences? Or is security
more often at odds with user values than was previously
assumed? We argue value conflicts are commonplace in
the use of security technologies, albeit little attention has
been devoted to them. Due to their nature, some categories
of security systems are likely to be concerned.
For instance, if users did pay attention to passive secu-
rity notifications like phishing bars, their productivity would
drastically decrease – in return for negilible security bene-
fits [14]. Their lack of attention could be explained by habit-
uation effects or insufficient visual cues, but also by a value
conflict with productivity. While designs that prevent habitu-
ation and provide more salient visual cues could solve the
former two issues, the existence of a value conflict entails
that passive notifications are fundamentally inadapted.
Authentication systems are too influenced by a multitude of
values. Productivity is a reason why users bypass authen-
tication systems altogether [15, 24]. Users also share au-
thentication credentials as a form of trust signalling [18, 19],
or to avoid excessive delays in authorising newcomers [3].
Some users do not trust providers of password managers
and want to ensure they can always access their pass-
words [8]. Reputation matters too: users may refuse to per-
form security actions to avoid embarassment should they
fail to use the mechanism [4, 10].
Dealing with Users’ Misconceptions about Security
One difficulty of security design is that users often struggle
to understand whether computer systems they use provide
security. Users rely on incorrect heuristics to determine if
a system is secure [8, 17], and on misconceptions on the
nature of threats they face [20, 25].
As such, users’ conception of a ‘security’ value differs from
the ‘security’ value that is imagined by the security engi-
neers who design security technologies. Ultimately, how the
presence of ‘security’ is perceived by users is irrelevant to
the actual presence of security. Users may perceive a sys-
tem to be ‘secure’ when it isn’t, or to be ‘insecure’ when it
is. This implies that security designers must design for se-
curity, but also for visual and interactional cues that signal
the ‘security’ value of their target users. Likewise, empirical
and technical analyses must distinguish security from user
‘security’ in order to be accurate.
VSD can Help Security Research
We have seen that value conflicts exist across multiple top-
ics covered in usable security research, both for personal
and organisational computing. Let us now discuss the ben-
efits of investigating these value conflicts.
Firstly, VSD forces security researchers to systematically
document users’ behaviour drivers. As we analyse more
systems with VSD, patterns of value conflicts might emerge
for families of security mechanisms, or for specific user pop-
ulations. For instance, all forms of delegated authentication
might conflict with privacy-oriented users. Workers who
frequently hire interns might always attempt to bypass cen-
tralised access control systems, etc. Knowing that such
patterns exist enables service providers to propose only
forms of security that will not conflict with user expectations.
It may help researchers identify which types of technologies
are likely to be unsuitable beyond repair, and which ones
are candidates for re-designing.
Secondly, fully designing, evaluating and deploying a secu-
rity artefact is costly. If security designers had the ability to
anticipate an artefact’s failure in the wild, they could spare
expenses by eliminating this artefact early in the design
cycle. Since value conflicts cause disengagement from se-
curity, Value-Sensitive conceptual and empirical analyses
of targeted use contexts are perfectly adequate tools to pro-
vide such design requirements.
Finally, VSD could be the tool we have been missing to ad-
dress security non-compliance. Methods of investigation
that solely observe lab interactions can only identify why
users fail to use a security mechanism, and only improve
task performance when users are already acceptant of
the security mechanism’s benefits. A security mechanism
that is more usable, but equally undesirable than currently
deployed ones will still be rejected by disengaged users.
Therefore, identifying the root causes of disengagement
can only be done by studying users’ rationales for not using
as security mechanism, not by studying how they, or others,
fail to use it when they already want to.
Conclusion
We have provided examples of how the current narrow fo-
cus on experts’ values when designing security leads to cir-
cumventions of security mechanisms and non-adoption of
secure solutions. Arguably, it also has done lasting damage
to the trust users have in what security experts tell them.
Usable security experts continue to disregard the prefer-
ences and priorities of users, the economic implications of
deploying non-user-centred security, and the disconnect be-
tween how security is valued by security experts and valued
by users. This lack of attention to users’ values has led to
unusable, ineffective and unused security mechanisms.
We propose to broaden our perspective on the goals of us-
able security research, by putting user values at the center,
and by making the protection against threats that expert
agree upon a secondary goal. Indeed, there cannot be
security without user adhesion. Mechanisms that are in-
efficient or useless stand no chance of actually improving
security out there in the wild. Security mechanisms must
respect what users value, be it productivity, cost, credibility,
etc. Embracing user values and designing value-sensitive
security mechanisms is the way towards security that is
adopted by users, and that actually works. The current
paradigm of usable security, leading to mechanisms which
not only users reject, but which also wastes effort and re-
sources for dubious security benefits, is no longer viable.
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